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COURT 017 APPEALS, 1955 TERM

Powers of Town Trustees
Section 64 of the New York Town Law' 4 gives the Town Board the
power to acquire and convey real property; and section 8115 provides that
the Board shall upon petition submit at an election any proposition dealing
with the acquisition of lands for a public parking place, a public playground,
or which is concerned with the dredging of a waterway.
On May 15, 1951, at a special town meeting of Huntington, Suffolk County,
Long Island, the voters approved the action of their Board of Trustees in
acquiring property for a beach, in making lease-purchase agreements for
parking areas and recteation fields, and in entering into a contract for the
sale of gravel and sand, by the dredging of the town's bay and harbor. These
three projects were combined in "Proposition Number One". In Knapp v.
Fasbender,'6 the plaintiff-taxpayers had commenced an action seeking to have
the proposition declared invalid for failure to comply with provisions of the
Town Law' 7 which prescribe that each proposition shall be separately numbered
and stated and that the amount of any obligation to be incurred shall be
stated. The plaintiffs had previously obtained a judgment' s to the effect
that the Trustees had no power to acquire the beach.
In a 4-3 decision the Court of Appeals affirmed Special Term's' 9 dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that the Trustees, in the ekercise of
their proprietary powers, could acquire property and enter into these contracts
without the necessity of a resolution of the Town Board and approval by the
voters. By basing its decision on this ground, the Court found it unnecessary to
pass on the validity of "Proposition Number One" - other adoption was
needless. The Court traced the Trustees' power back to the Constitution of
1777 which ratified the original grants from the Colonial Governors; pointed
to decisions which recognized the Trustees20 and their power to acquire 2 1 and
dispose2 2 of property; examined a 1952 local law2 3 passed after the instant
action was started and entided "an act to ratify and confirm the title of the
14.
15.
16.
17.

N. Y. TOWN LAW §64 (2).
N. Y. TOWN LAW §81 (1) (d), (g).
1 N. Y. 2d 212, 134 N. E. 2d 482 (1956).
N. Y. TOWN LAW §§82, 223.

18. Knapp v. Fasbender, 278 App. Div. 970, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 780 (2d Dep't
1951), appeal withdrawn, 303 N. Y. 803, 104 N. E. 2d 361 (1952).
19. Knapp v. Fasbender, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd rnem., 281
App. Div. 893, 120 N. Y. S. 2d 517 (2d Dep't 1953).
20. Trustees of Freeholders and Commonalty of Town of Southampton v.
Jessup, 162 N. Y. 122, 56 N. E. 538 (1900).
21. Town of Islip v. Estates of Havemeyer Point, 224 N. Y. 449, 121 N. E.
351 (1918).
22. Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N. Y. 41, 175 N. E. 506 (1931).
23. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1252, c. 816.
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trustees . . . and to ratify and confirm the acts of its board of trustees 24.. ."; and
found that the 1952 legislation confirmed these proprietary powers.
Judge Van Voorhis writing for the minority felt that the only issue on
appeal was the validity of "Proposition Number One". He reasoned that it
was invalid because it combined three propositions - beach, parking and
recreation, and dredging - into one which is contrary to the prescriptions
of the town law. He also found the proposition to be invalid for its failure
to state the amount of obligations which the Town was incurring. As regards
the applicability of the 1952 legislation to the proposition and to the powers
of the Trustees, the minority contended that its only purpose was to quiet
title of the land held by and through the Trustees. In the minority's opinion,
the provision stating that the Trustees had the power to acquire real and personal property was limited to those acquisitions incident to the disposition and
conservation of property already held by the Trustees. And, though admitting
the Trustees had the power to sell the sand and gravel in the harbor, the
minority viewed the contract's primary purpose to be the improvement of navigation which is a governmental function2 5 to be exercised by the Town Board
subject to proper approval.
Doubtless the Court went behind the issue presented by this case in
order to put an end to the attacks upon the acts of the Trustees. This writer
wonders, however, whether in attempting to settle one controversy the Court
has not planted seeds of others when it appears to be the purpose of the
Town Law to have these functions initiated by the town board subject to the
voters' approval.

REAL PROPERTY
Deeds-Right of Selection
Lipton v. Bruce' presented the Court of Appeals with two unusual and interesting problems. Firstly, whether a deed of "one acre of land out of the above
described premises, or so much thereof as the party of the second part may require
for a cottage lot . . ." was an attempted conveyance, void for uncertainty of
description,2 a conveyance of an undivided interest, 3 or the conferral of a right to
24. The Court also found that this legislation did not violate the requirements of the New York Constitution which provides that no special law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title, N. Y. CONST.
Art. 111, §15 (1938); nor did it violate the Constitutional provision which states
that an existing law is not to be made applicable by reference, N. Y. CONST. Art.
111, §16 (1938).
25. See People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N. Y. 459, 113 N. E. 521 (1916).
1. 1 N. Y. 2d 631, 136 N. E. 2d 900 (1956).
2. Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563, 5 So. 104 (1888).
3. Morris v. Baird, 72 W. Va. 1, 78 S.E. 371 (1913).

